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I. Introduction
1. The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) holds the potential
to boost intra-African trade by 52.3% through eliminating import duties—and if
non-tariff  barriers are also reduced, it will double the projected amount.1 Deeper
integration under the African Union (AU), through reducing both tariff  and non-
tariff  barriers, will allow firms to transcend national borders and can serve as the
foundation for developing regional value chains. However, cross-border trade also
provides an opportunity for cross border anti-competitive business practices in
Africa to emerge. If competition rules lag behind economic liberalisation process,
the benefits of integration can be undermined through the foreclosure of markets by 
private companies. Market forces, when left on their own through the liberalisation 
process, do not automatically produce the desired efficiencies in the economy and
foster sustainable development. Firms can abuse their dominant market position
through predatory behaviour to eliminate local competition, or through forming
cartels to fix higher prices and other market-sharing agreements. If no safeguards
exist to prevent anti-competitive practices, no fundamental change will occur in
the incentives facing firms to improve their overall behaviour and performance.2
2. There is therefore considerable merit in developing modalities under the
African Union for continental co-operation in relation to anti-competitive
practices affecting the interests of several members.3 A prerequisite set of rules
is required on how to engage in commercial and industrial activities that are
conducive and responsive to efficient marketplace behaviour. Competition law
is designed to enhance the economic welfare of people by, among other things,
breaking down private barriers to commerce and preventing the creation and
misuse of corporate power through cartels and monopolistic strategies.4 Within
the EU, effective competition has both increased market integration and boosted
the competitiveness of European companies in the single market and globally.5
1  The 2019 African Union Handbook, 23.
2  WTO Secretariat, Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of  Trade and Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth (1998), 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy WT/WGTCP/W/80, 8.
3  T. Hartzenberg, Cooperation on competition in the AfCFTA, tralacBlog (accessed 22/09/2019 at: www.tralac.org/blog/article/14078-
cooperation-on-competition-in-the-afcfta.html).
4  E. M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access (1997) 91 AJIL 1. 
5  European Court of  Auditors, 2018.
International
Kamala Dawar
k.dawar@sussex.ac.uk
Senior Lecturer
Sussex University School of Law, 
Brighton
George Lipimile
glipimile@comesa.int
CEO
COMESA Competition Commission, 
Malawi
ABSTRACT
This article examines the process 
of harmonisation of competition law 
and policy in Africa in the context of economic 
integration under the African Continental Free 
Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). The article 
undertakes a comparative examination 
of the various stages of development 
of domestic competition laws and authorities 
across Africa. It identifies the challenge 
of the different and overlapping membership 
of the Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), as well as the diversity among 
the regional competition policy frameworks 
that have developed on the African continent. 
The article concludes by discussing 
the various options and recommendations 
for harmonising competition policy and 
integrating competition law in the context 
of the AfCFTA under African Union law. 
Cet article examine le processus 
d’harmonisation du droit et de la politique 
de la concurrence en Afrique dans le contexte 
de l’intégration économique par l’accord 
de libre-échange continental africain (ALEAC). 
L’article entreprend un examen comparatif 
des différents stades de développement 
des lois et autorités nationales 
de la concurrence en Afrique. Il met 
en lumière le défi que représentent 
les différences et les chevauchements 
existants entre les Communautés 
économiques régionales (CER), ainsi que 
la diversité des cadres régionaux de politique 
de la concurrence qui se sont développés 
sur le continent africain. L’article se termine 
par une discussion des différentes options 
et recommandations pour l’harmonisation 
de la politique de la concurrence 
et l’intégration du droit de la concurrence 
dans le contexte de l’accord de libre-échange 
entre l’Afrique et l’Union africaine. 
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3. However, trade and competition are often seen
through separate policy lenses. Traditionally, trade
law has involved public restraints of trade; antitrust or
competition law has concerned private restraints. Trade
law, by definition, is internationally oriented, whereas
competition law has national roots.6 Trade policy
fosters these goals primarily through the reduction of
government-imposed barriers to international commerce,
while competition policy addresses principally anti-
competitive practices of enterprises that impede the
efficient functioning of markets. Yet neither instrument is
likely to be fully successful in the absence of the other.7
4. The AfCFTA negotiations have also separated
competition from trade policy. The Phase I negotiations
covered trade integration while the ongoing Phase  II
negotiating issues include the Competition Protocol.
Yet the African integration process needs a strong
guiding role in ensuring that competition policy and
trade liberalisation complement each other in promoting
efficiency, consumer welfare, growth and development.
In Africa, as in many developing countries, governments
have had large government-owned sectors, various
government-granted exclusive economic privileges, a
tradition of cartels, and general lack of transparency
regarding market access and the opportunities for
foreign businesses to challenge incumbents. A regional
integration policy needs to take account of the probability 
that the removal of border barriers will fuel the incentives 
of governments and firms to find other ways to re-erect
barriers and protect their historical advantage—through
anti-competitive business practices.
5. The challenge for the AU institutions and instruments
is to address the linkages between trade and competition
that will influence the pattern of African economic
integration. This will require providing the legal
clarity and consistency to harmonise continent-wide
competition principles and enforcement. Yet with the
necessary political will, the AU is uniquely positioned
to accommodate the sovereignty of the State Parties,
the variable geometry and overlapping membership in
the RECs.
6. The article is set out as follows: Section  II looks at
the process of economic integration in Africa under the
AfCFTA. Section  III sets out the issue of overlapping
membership and variable geometry among the domestic
competition regimes and within the RECs. Section
IV concludes with an analysis of the different options
and recommendations for promoting harmonising
competition principles under the African Union.
6  E. M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access (n. 7) 3. 
7  See: WTO Secretariat Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of  Trade and Competition Po-
licy to Development and Economic Growth, Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy WT/WGTCP/W/80, 18 September 1998. 
II. The context of
economic integration
in Africa
7. Compared with norm development in the human
rights sphere, development in the business and economic
sphere in Africa has been slow and with lesser overall
impact.8 The economic and business integration effort in
Africa began in earnest with the adoption in 1991 of the
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community
(Abuja Treaty).9 The Abuja Treaty aims to unify the
continent’s economy through the establishment of free
trade and monetary union, leading to the establishment
of the African Economic Community (AEC).10 In March 
2018, the African Union Assembly Summit adopted the
AfCFTA Agreement, the Protocol on Trade in Goods, the 
Protocol on Trade in Services, and the Protocol on Rules
and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes. There is
indication that trading under the AfCFTA Agreement
will begin on 1 July 2020, while a draft Competition
Protocol11 is expected in January 2021.12
8. The AfCFTA formally recognises the existing
achievements of integration through FTAs and customs
unions, and positions the RECs as the building blocks
that will lead to the establishment of a continental trading
community.13 The AfCFTA takes a two-tier approach:
while AfCFTA law shall prevail in event of conflict or
inconsistency with a regional agreement, State Parties that
have attained a higher level of integration shall maintain such 
higher levels as they are seen as beneficial. More explicitly,
Article  19 recognises variable geometry among the RECs,
providing for differentiated integration.14 Variable geometry
allows for progression in cooperation among groups within
the Community for wider integration schemes in various
fields and at different speeds. It is also a principle of some of
the RECs, such as the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement15
and the East African Community (EAC) Treaty.16
8  A. Olufemi, African Union Law: The Emergence of  a Sui Generis Legal Order (Routledge, 
2017) (n. 4) 65. 
9  The Abuja Treaty entered into force on 12 May 1994.
10  The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, Article 4(d) Objectives. Under 
Article 6, the Community is established in six stages beginning with the creation of  regional 
blocs. Successive stages include the establishment of  free trade areas and customs unions in 
each REC, the creation of  a continental customs union, the creation of  an African common 
market and the establishment of  an African economic monetary union and a parliament.
11  Along with protocols on investment, and intellectual property rights. 
12  The AU Assembly requested African Union Ministers to submit the draft legal texts to the January 
2021 Session of  the Assembly for adoption through the Specialised Technical Committee on Jus-
tice and Legal Affairs, Key Decisions of  the 32nd Ordinary Session of  the Assembly of  the Afri-
can Union (February 2019), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/2754/2019_
February%20Summit_keyDecision_E.pdf ?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
13  The African Continental Free Trade Agreement, Preamble. 
14  The African Continental Free Trade Agreement, Article 19.
15  The Agreement Establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area among the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community and the Southern African 
Development Community, Article 6.
16  The East African Community Treaty, Article 7(1)(e). Ce
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III.Variable geometry
and overlapping
membership
9. Although the RECs are the designated building blocks
under the AfCFTA, the State Parties are individually
responsible for implementing the AfCFTA obligations.
The harmonisation challenge here is to reconcile the
overlapping membership of diverse countries in different
RECs and customs unions, which can lead to legal
conflicts where there is also variable geometry between
them. Table  1 highlights the diversity in establishing
competition legislation and competition authorities
at the domestic level. It also indicates the multiplicity
and overlapping memberships across the African
continent. It suggests a potential for conflicts of law and
implementation to emerge, should there be differences
in the applicable regional competition laws for those
countries falling under more than one REC.
10. To address cross-border anti-competitive practices
effectively, the individual countries of Africa not only
require a strong national competition law and authority,
but they must also cooperate with each other based on
trust and shared competition principles. Yet countries in
Africa are at four broad different stages of competition
law and policy implementation: 1) The 25 countries which 
have both a competition law in force and an operational
competition authority;17 2) The eight countries which
have enacted competition law but have not yet established 
a competition authority;18 3) The four countries where
the preparation of competition legislation has reached
a very advanced stage;19 and 4) The 18 countries which
do not have a competition law or are still at early stages
17  Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ivory Coast, 
Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, eSwatini (formerly Swaziland), Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.
18  Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Mali, Mozambique, and Rwanda
19  Lesotho, Niger, Togo, and Uganda.
Table 1. African country membership in the RECs
Number of 
Countries
Country National 
Competition 
Legislation
National Competition 
Authority
African Regional Economic Community
1 Algeria Yes Yes
2 Angola Yes No SADC, ECCAS
3 Benin No No ECOWAS, WAEMU
4 Botswana Yes Yes SACU, SADC
5 Burkina Faso Yes Yes ECOWAS, WAEMU
6 Burundi Yes No COMESA, EAC, ECCAS
7 Cabo Verde Yes No ECOWAS
8 Cameroon Yes Yes CEMAC, ECCAS
9 Central African Republic No No CEMAC, ECCAS
10 Chad No No CEMAC, ECCAS
11 Comoros Yes No COMESA
12 Congo (Brazzaville) No No CEMAC, ECCAS
13 Congo (Democratic Republic 
of)
Yes Yes COMESA, SADC, ECCAS
14 Côte d’Ivoire Yes Yes ECOWAS, WAEMU
15 Djibouti Yes No COMESA
16 Egypt Yes Yes COMESA
17 Equatorial Guinea No No CEMAC, ECCAS
18 Eritrea No No COMESA
19 Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) Yes Yes COMESA, SACU, SADC
20 Ethiopia Yes Yes COMESA
21 Gabon No No CEMAC, ECCAS
22 Gambia (The) Yes Yes ECOWAS
23 Ghana No No ECOWAS
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of preparation of competition legislation.20 This has 
implications for an AfCFTA vision of a continental 
competition regime as well as how to achieve it. 
20  Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mauritania, Réunion, São Tomé and 
Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Western Sahara. 
1. Variable geometry in REC 
and Customs Unions’ 
competition regimes 
11.  While some RECs have established supreme 
regional competition authorities, others operate 
through a cooperation framework with few competition 
requirements for their members. There is considerable 
variation across RECs, in terms of level of ambition and 
institutional arrangements. 
24 Guinea No No ECOWAS
25 Guinea Bissau No No ECOWAS, WAEMU
26 Kenya Yes Yes COMESA, EAC
27 Lesotho Draft No SACU, SADC
28 Liberia Yes Yes ECOWAS
29 Libya No No COMESA
30 Madagascar Yes Yes COMESA, SADC
31 Malawi Yes Yes COMESA, SADC
32 Mali Yes No ECOWAS, WAEMU
33 Mauritania No No  
34 Mauritius Yes Yes COMESA, SADC
35 Morocco Yes Yes  
36 Mozambique Yes No SADC
37 Namibia Yes Yes SACU, SADC
38 Niger Draft No ECOWAS
39 Nigeria Yes Yes ECOWAS
40 Réunion No No  
41 Rwanda Yes No COMESA, EAC
42 São Tomé and Principe No No ECCAS
43 Senegal Yes Yes ECOWAS
44 Seychelles Yes Yes COMESA, SADC
45 Sierra Leone No No ECOWAS
46 Somalia No No  
47 South Africa Yes Yes SACU, SADC
48 Sudan Yes No COMESA
49 South Sudan No No EAC
50 Tanzania Yes Yes EAC, SADC
51 Togo Draft No ECOWAS, WAEMU
52 Uganda Draft No EAC
53 Western Sahara No No  
54 Zambia Yes Yes COMESA, SADC
55 Zimbabwe Yes Yes COMESA, SADC
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1.1 Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA)*
12. Among all the regional trade agreements in Africa,
COMESA has the largest membership with nineteen
members21 and has the most established and developed
regional competition authority in Africa, based on
the EU competition regime. The rules encompass
government subsidies, private anti-competitive practices
and anti-dumping rules. Article 55 empowers the Council 
of Minister of the Common Market to make regulations
on competition. The 2004 COMESA Competition
Regulations and Competition Rules established a merger
control regime for cross-border cases and to address other 
competition law and consumer protection matters.22
Two competition bodies have been established for the
purposes of enforcing competition law in the Common
Market.23
13. The COMESA competition regulations are superior
to national competition laws and are directly applicable
in COMESA Member States. COMESA introduces a
regional competition regime to be implemented at both
national and regional level depending on whether an anti-
competitive practice has cross-border effects. Almost all
the COMESA Member States have adopted competition
laws in the last few years. The regional competition rules
recognise that closer cooperation between COMESA
Member States in the form of notification, exchange of
information, coordination of actions and consultations
among Member States should be encouraged. Since the
Commission became operational in 2013, it has decided
over 100 merger cases.24 Since 2017, it has investigated
ten cases of anti-competitive practices or requests for
authorisations, issuing decisions for six to date. Of these
three identified anti-competitive concerns in relation to
restrictions to passive pricing and the duration of non-
compete clauses,25 and one addressed harmful vertical
restraints and fixed price and profit margins.26
*  The Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa was signed in 
1994 as a succevssor to the 1981 Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa, 1. 
21  Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of  the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
22  The COMESA Competition Regulations and Competition Rules Article 5 states: “Member 
States shall take all appropriate measures (…) to ensure fulfilment of  the obligations arising 
out of  these Regulations or resulting from action taken by the [COMESA Competition] 
Commission under these Regulations.”
23  The COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) became operational in January 2013, and is 
responsible for investigating anti-competitive practices and reviewing merger control filings; 
The Board of  Commissioners makes rulings, imposes remedies and hears appeals against 
decisions of  the CCC.
24  African Competition Law Developments in 2018 and the outlook for 2019 (accessed 
27/09/2019 at: https://www.lexafrica.com/competition-law-outlook-for-2019).
25  Decision/RBP/5/2018, Distribution Agreement between the Wirtgen Group and the Motor 
& Engineering Company of  Ethiopia Limited S.C; Decision/RBP/4/2018, Distribution 
Agreement between Wirtgen Group and Sodirex SA, Madagascar; Decision/RBP/2/2018, 
Distribution Agreement between Wirtgen Group and UMCL Ltd of  Mauritius.
26  Decision/RBP/1/2018, Distribution Agreements between The Coca-Cola Company and its 
Distributors in Ethiopia and Comoros.
1.2 East African Community (EAC)
14. The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC27 entered 
into force in July 2000. A Customs Union was created in
2005,28 followed by the EAC Common Market Protocol
in July 2010.29 There is compatibility with the COMESA
because the Protocol on the Establishment of an EAC
Customs Union contains competition provisions that are
in harmony with the COMESA competition regulations,
both in content and coverage.30
15. The EAC Competition Act was enacted in 2006 to
promote and protect fair competition in the Community,
to provide for consumer welfare, to establish the EAC
Competition Authority (EACCA) and for related
matters.31 The EAC Competition Act provides that
the EACCA shall have all powers, express and implied
necessary for and conducive to the implementation
and enforcement of the EAC Competition Law.32
The EACCA is an independent organ of EAC but subject 
to judicial review by the East African Court of Justice.33
The focus of the EACCA has been less on mergers but
on investigating firms and trade associations engaged in
malpractices and the exploitation of consumers through
price fixing.34 No cases have been decided.
16. Among the EAC members’ competition regimes, four
out of the six members have a national competition law,
while Uganda and South Sudan have draft competition
bills pending. Emerging harmonising challenges include
its overlap with the existing Tanzanian and Kenyan
national regulators, as well as with the COMESA
Commission. Nevertheless, the compatibility of the two
competition regimes in these two RECs already provides
a harmonising dynamic under the framework of the
AfCFTA.
1.3 Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS)
17. ECOWAS is a regional grouping of fifteen Member
States35 founded in 1975 via the Treaty of Lagos,36 to
promote economic integration. ECOWAS introduced
competition legislation in 2008 through the ECOWAS
Supplementary Act on the “Adoption of Community
27  The Treaty for the Establishment of  the East African Community (EAC). The EAC comprises 
six Partner States: The Republic of  Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United 
Republic of  Tanzania, and the Republic of  Uganda.
28  The Protocol on the establishment of  the East African Customs Union took effect in 2010.
29  Ibid.
30  Ibid., Article 21.
31  The East African Community Competition Act, 2006, Section 42.
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid., Sections 44 and 46.
34  https://www.lexafrica.com/competition-law-outlook-for-2019.
35  Member countries making up ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo. 
36  Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS) Revised Treaty (1993). Ce
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Competition Rules and the modalities of their application 
within ECOWAS.”37 The objectives of the Supplementary 
Act include prohibiting any anti-competitive business 
conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition 
at regional level and ensuring consumers’ welfare. It 
also provides for the establishment of the ECOWAS 
Competition Authority to implement Community 
Standards Competition rules and regulations within the 
ECOWAS Community.38 
18. There is considerable variable geometry between the 
ECOWAS and the COMESA and EAC competition 
regimes. There are several ECOWAS members that do 
not yet possess a competition law or authority, such 
as Guinea, Sierra Leone and Niger. Yet ECOWAS 
also includes the eight members of the sub-regional 
bloc West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU), which has a stronger competition regime 
based on regional competition law and a supranational 
competition authority (discussed below). 
1.4 West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
19.  The WAEMU was established in 1994 with eight 
Member States, who all have membership of ECOWAS.39 
Unlike ECOWAS, the fundamental principles of 
WAEMU include the primacy of community law 
over national law along with the direct and immediate 
applicability of community law.40 WAEMU has a 
common regional competition policy under Articles  88 
to 90 of the WAEMU Treaty.41 The WAEMU Court of 
Justice has stated that competition authorities of Member 
States do not have competence to regulate and monitor 
competition.42 In 2002, WAEMU adopted regulations 
on anti-competitive practices; on procedures governing 
cartels and abuse of dominant position; and on State 
aid.43 In addition, a directive was adopted on cooperation 
between the Commission and the competition bodies of 
Member States for the application of Articles 88, 89 and 
90 of the WAEMU Treaty. WAEMU also operates a 
voluntary merger filing regime, although the competition 
authority has made a relatively small number of merger 
decisions.
37  ECOWAS Supplementary Act A/SA.1/06/08 of  19 December 2008 on the Adoption of  
Community Competition Rules and the modalities of  their application within ECOWAS.
38  Article  11(2) of  the Supplementary Act empowers the ERCA to approve mergers, 
acquisitions, or other business combinations prohibited under Article  7 of  the 
Supplementary Act, if  such transaction is in the public interest.
39  Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
40  Article 6 of  UEMOA Treaty.
41  Treaty Establishing the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 1994.
42  UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of  Competition Policy: West African Economic and 
Monetary Union, Benin and Senegal Overview, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/1 (Overview), 
(New York and Geneva, 2007) p. 11. 
43  Regulation No. 2/2002/CM/UEMOA of  23 May 2002 on anti-competitive practices within 
the WAEMU.
20.  While WAEMU has a strong EU type competition 
regime, along the lines of COMESA and EAC, it is not 
well integrated with the other RECs, including in its 
overlapping membership with ECOWAS. Harmonisation 
is, however, strong within WAEMU’s centralised 
competition regime, despite variations in competition 
among the members. For example, Benin and Guinea 
Bissau do not have national competition laws but they 
approved the WAEMU Treaty and hence the competition 
provisions thereof.44 These countries still address anti-
competitive practices in a harmonised manner, but by 
reporting these cases to the WAEMU Commission. 
1.5 Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU)
21. SACU was established in 1910 and is the oldest customs 
union in the world.45 The revised SACU Agreement of 
2002 came into force on 15 July 2004.46 The Agreement 
contains only two Articles on competition: Article  40 
expresses the agreement of Member States that there 
should be competition policies in each Member State and 
obliges the Member States to co-operate with each other 
on enforcement of competition laws and regulations. 
Article  41 obliges the Council of SACU to develop 
policies and instruments to address unfair trade practices 
between Member States. Such policies and measures are 
to be annexed to the SACU Agreement. 
22.  The SACU members have widely divergent 
territory size, development levels, and size of national 
firms. Its  members have not agreed to harmonise their 
competition policies, or address cross-border anti-
competitive practices occurring within the SACU. 
Rather, the SACU Treaty defers to the Member States for 
effective application of their national competition laws. 
The SACU Council has the authority to identify and 
address unfair trade practices by policies and instruments 
through establishing Technical Liaison Committees.47 
However, the role and duties of Member States in giving 
legal effect to these policies are not specified. Several of 
SACU’s members are members of SADC.
44  In 2015, Niger validated a new Competition and Consumer Protection Law that replaces a 
1992 law that was never fully operational. Togo’s own competition law was replaced by the 
WAEMU community law on competition, which took effect on 1 January 2003. A National 
Competition and Consumption Commission became operational in Togo in 2006.
45  SACU Member States include Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland 
(http://www.sacu.int).
46  The 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement
47  Article 12 of  the Treaty provides Technical Liaison Committees. Ce
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1.6 Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)
23. The Southern African Development Community
(SADC)48 was established in August 1992.49 The SADC
Trade Protocol50 requires Member States to implement
measures within the Community that prohibit unfair
business practices and promote competition. All SADC
Member States are also bound by the 2009 Declaration
on Regional Cooperation and Consumer Policies,51
to make cooperation effective, and take the required
steps to adopt and implement the necessary domestic
competition and consumer protection laws in their
respective countries.
24. The regional approach adopted by SADC differs
from the EU supranational approach adopted by
COMESA, EAC and WAEMU. The SADC competition
policy focuses on cooperation between its members,
who are encouraged to implement effective competition
laws domestically. However, discussions have started to
establish a regional competition framework by 2020,
which if  based on the same competition principles
as COMESA and the EAC, could promote AU wide
harmonised competition policies.
1.7 Central African Economic 
and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
25. The Treaty establishing the Economic and Customs
Union of Central Africa advocates finding solutions to
phase out restrictive business practices between Member
States.52 The CEMAC competition regime includes laws
and institutions, but is far less established than WAEMU
or COMESA. The 1999 Regulation on anti-competitive
business practices53 prohibits any practice likely to
constitute an obstacle to the free play of competition
and in particular cartels, abuse of dominance, and
concentrations that significantly reduce competition.
The CEMAC competition regulation establishes the
CEMAC Commission, the CEMAC Court of Justice,
and the Regional Competition Council. CEMAC has
introduced a mandatory merger control regime. Although 
the CEMAC competition authority is not yet fully
operational, it is starting to accept merger notifications.
48  Member States of  SADC are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of  Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, United Republic of  Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
49  The 2015 Consolidated Treaty of  the Southern African Development Community 
incorporates: the Treaty of  the Southern African Development Community, 1992 and 
subsequent Amendments to the Treaty.
50  The SADC Protocol on Trade (2006), amended 2010, Article 25.
51  The SADC Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies 
(2009).
52  The Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of  Central African States, Article 28(5). 
Its members are: Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of  the 
Congo and Equatorial Guinea. 
53  CEMAC Regulation No. 1/99/UEAC-CM-639 of  25 June 1999 on Abuse of  Dominance 
and Monopoly.
26. Several CEMAC countries do not yet have competition 
laws or authorities, such as the Central African Republic, 
Chad, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. There is also some
overlapping membership with the Economic Community
of Central African States.
1.6 Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS)
27. ECCAS is an economic community established for the 
purpose of promoting regional economic cooperation in
central Africa.54 Article 6 of the 1992 Treaty establishing
ECCAS indicates the creation of a free trade area and a
customs union in twenty years.55 Regional competition
policy is the least developed in the ECCAS. It does not
provide for any regional framework or harmonising
dynamic for its members competition laws.
IV. Options
for harmonising
competition law
in Africa
28. Given the challenges of overlapping membership, the
diverse stages of development in domestic competition
regimes and the variable geometry of the RECs, it is
useful to identify the main approaches to harmonising
domestic competition laws and policies. The strongest
option is full integration or unification of competition
law, and is typically based on the EU experience. Such
an approach has been followed in WAEMU, COMESA
and EAC. It includes the establishment of a nearly
complete continental competition policy or code, along
with a supranational enforcement agency that deals
with cross-border anti-competitive practices. At present,
the institutional framework for variable geometry
provided by the Abuja Treaty and the AfCFTA does not
promulgate this option. For despite the advances made in 
some of the RECs, it does not correspond to the context
of the African continent. Member countries belonging to 
RECs such as CEMAC, SACU or the ECCAS have not
agreed to develop and enforce competition laws either
regionally or domestically.
29. The second approach entails no continental level law,
but rather a policy of harmonising national competition
laws incrementally through bottom-up convergence.
This  can be achieved through cross-fertilisation or
convergence of national law or enforcement agency
cooperation, complemented by sectoral agreements.
This approach produces a bilateral type of harmonisation, 
54  The Member States of  ECCAS are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of  the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, São 
Tomé and Principe. 
55  The Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of  Central African States (1992). Ce
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based on shared principles. It can involve the concept of 
outbound extraterritoriality through which national law 
can cover foreign actors that hurt the regulating nation’s 
firms, and also nationals of the regulating nation that 
hurt foreigners. However, in the African context, this 
approach is less relevant for integrating those countries 
with more nascent competition norms and enforcement 
systems. It does not take advantage of the more advanced 
RECs in converging competition principles between 
COMESA, EAC and WAEMU, to more effectively 
underpin cross border trade liberalisation.
30. The third approach focuses on developing and
integrating competition regimes using continental wide
minimum standard competition principles and strengthen 
cooperation between competition authorities. This leads
to tripartite-like arrangements that link principles of a
constitutional dimension that prohibit anti-competitive
blockages of market access and transnational cartels,
and provide a discipline for unjustified government
trade-restraining acts. Under this approach, states
would be required to prohibit the few consensus wrongs
domestically. This approach seems most relevant for the
AfCFTA. The Protocol on Competition could provide
clear guidance on implementing these principles along
common lines among the RECs and State Parties. The
Protocol could focus on those matters of principle in the
State Parties or RECs that are currently incompatible,
or run contrary to AEC trade policies. For example, the
time periods for pre-merger notification filings can be
harmonised. Countries and RECs can agree to accept
pre-merger filings prepared for the first jurisdiction in
which a filing is made, with supplements as necessary to
cover different markets. Stronger cooperation can also
be required among agencies when investigating anti-
competitive conduct. Under this approach, the RECs
both to support the State Parties and implement top-down 
African Union guidance on cross-border competition
issues. This serves to ensure that the different competition 
strategies of individual states are brought into alignment
by the integrating role of the RECs. The AfCFTA’s two-
tier system is compatible with this third approach. It can
provide direction on harmonising minimum competition
principles among RECs to reduce the variable geometry
in their competition regimes, and also integrate diverse
countries with overlapping membership.
31. One legal obstacle here is that while the AfCFTA
is an element of the AU structures and programmes, it
is not endowed with a legal personality. Instead, under
AfCFTA Article  13(3), the Secretariat is provided
with sui generis personality features, as a functionally
autonomous institutional body within the African
Union system with an independent legal personality. Yet,
the rights and duties of the Secretariat are not specified
in the AfCFTA and there are no precedents in the AU
system to indicate the sort of independent legal powers
the Secretariat will enjoy.56 These need clarification
through Council of Ministers’ decisions adopted under
56  G. Erasmus, The AfCFTA Institutions: Could the Secretariat Hold the Key to Implementation 
(2019), tralac Working Paper US19WP01, 6.
Article  13.57 An effective AfCFTA Secretariat would 
provide an AU level focal point for cooperating with the 
RECs to find consensus on convergence towards similar 
competition principles and the minimum standards 
appropriate for the individual members. 
32. Another challenge lies in the decision-making
structure of AfCFTA institutions. Article  9 of the
AfCFTA establishes the Assembly, Council of Ministers,
Committee of Senior Trade Officials as well as the
Secretariat.58 The Assembly is the highest decision-
making organ, with the exclusive authority to adopt
interpretations of the Agreement.59 A Council of
Ministers supports and is responsible to the Assembly.60
Although all the AU Member States participate in the
Council of Ministers, there is no formal role for the RECs. 
The Council can make decisions within its mandate that
are binding on the State Parties.61 However, only State
Parties are represented in the AfCFTA Council—again,
not the RECs. The Committee of Senior Trade Officials62
consists of officials designated by each State Party to
implement Council of Ministers’ decisions. Here the
RECs are represented, but only in an advisory capacity.
This leaves open how strong this representational
function will be.
33. The lack of formal REC participation in decision-
making processes undermines their role as building
blocks for integration and harmonising African countries’ 
competition laws. The AU framework needs to harness
the RECs to inform the institutional decision-making
processes. The expertise of the RECs is vital as some
African countries are not participating in some of the
Phase II competition negotiations. Lack of participation
by both countries and the RECS detracts from effective
coordination of diverse national and regional strategies
on cross-border competition law and enforcement issues.
In the area of competition, enforcement is often a
greater problem than establishing laws. Without credible
enforcement mechanisms, the incentives for governments
to prevent unfair business practices are reduced. In the
event of disputes between the parties under the AfCFTA, 
the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement
of Disputes provides a detailed legal instrument to
address disputes regarding the interpretation and/or
application of the Agreement in relation to their rights
and obligations.63 However, the Protocol does not provide 
jurisdiction over AU legal instruments, which includes
the Protocol on Competition.
57  The African Continental Free Trade Agreement, Article 13. 
58  Ibid., Article 9: Institutional Framework for the Implementation of  the AfCFTA.
59  Ibid., Article 10: The Assembly.
60  Ibid., Article 11: The Composition and Functions of  the Council of  Ministers.
61  Ibid., Article 11.5: “Decisions that have legal, structural or financial implications shall [only] 
be binding on State Parties upon their adoption by the Assembly.”
62  Ibid., Article 12.
63  Ibid., Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of  Disputes, Article 1. Ce
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34. Additional legal instruments are required to offer
further clarity and guidance on competition law and
enforcement issues. This requires a legal committee
specifically charged with the responsibility of drawing
up legal texts for the several protocols under the
Treaty, or for advancing cooperation with regard to the
development of trade law and commercial practices
within the community. However, this is not provided
for under Article  25 Abuja Treaty dealing with the
establishment of specialised technical committees.64
Yet such a competition committee could provide the
necessary harmonising impetus by preparing studies
and recommendations on challenges in the process of
harmonisation and unification, preparation of model
laws and uniform laws, promotion of the codification
and wider acceptance of competition terms, customs
and principles and the promotion of their uniform
interpretation and application. It would establish a
common platform for consulting Member States and the
RECs when harmonising and implementing competition
policy under the AfCFTA.
64  A. Olufemi, African Union Law: The Emergence of  a Sui Generis Legal Order (n. 4) 71. 
V. Conclusions
35. This article has presented the benefits and challenges
of harmonising competition law under the AfCFTA.
The task for the AU is to promulgate minimum
requirement competition principles that can build upon
the achievements of established regional competition
regimes, while harmonising the actions of diverse
State Parties. Such a framework requires the effective
participation of both the RECs and the members in the
various AU and AfCFTA institutional and decision-
making bodies relevant to competition issues.
36. The forthcoming Protocol on Competition will
be central for ensuring an effective role for the RECs
in pushing harmonisation of  minimum requirement
competition principles both between and within their
respective competition regimes. It can mitigate the
fact that the RECs do not have the legal standing to
represent themselves in AfCFTA and AU decision-
making structures on trade and competition matters.
The Protocol can similarly advance cooperation
through establishing specialised technical committees.
This will also allow for the codification and wider
acceptance of  regional competition terms, customs
and practices and a uniform interpretation, appli-
cation and enforcement of  principles. Both political
will and legal role of  AU institutions and instruments
are crucial to this endeavour. The AU cannot rely on
an incremental bottom-up harmonisation process. This
will face resistance from domestic vested interests and
lag too far behind the integration of  trade taking place
across the continent. For implementing continent-
wide trade liberalisation policies without the necessary
competition rules to address cross-border anti-
competitive practices can frustrate the benefits to be
reaped from the AfCFTA. n
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